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Abstract
This thesis studies the cash management strategy for banks subject to various regu-
lations, such as the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), the leverage ratio, and the capital
ratio. We build models that incorporate the stochastic processes into cash outows
and inows, and lead to an adequate liquidity buer over the regulatory requirements
in the light of the risk tolerance of a bank. As a special case, we treat the net cash
outows as the geometric Brownian motion, and obtain an optimal liquidity buer an-
alytically. For general cases, we treat cash outows and inows as stochastic processes
and develop an approximated liquidity buer by employing Monte-Carlo simulation.
Moreover, we obtain workable targets for both the LCR and the capital requirement
by incorporating a regulatory cost function.
Keywords: nancial regulation, LCR, liquidity risk, funding strategy, liquidity buer,
capital requirement, leverage ratio
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The recent regulatory reforms make banks puzzled about how to control the balance
sheets seeking protability. We hereby clarify about the puzzle and explain about
contributions of our study.
1.1 Background
We clarify issues for banks caused by the recent regulatory reforms and the requirement
of the risk governance.
1.1.1 Regulatory Reforms
In the late 2000's, the global nancial crisis occurred. One of these backdrops was the
insucient liquidity risk management. Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund in-
creases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable
losses. The fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of short-term
deposits into long-term loans makes banks vulnerable to liquidity risk as shown in
Figure1.1. After the crisis, starting from the Washington Summit in November 2008,
several regulatory reforms including enhancement of liquidity risk management had
been discussed to prevent such aairs from reoccurring. Then, new instruments for
supervising the liquidity risk were suggested. One is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)
and the other is the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). These are collectively called the
liquidity regulation. The LCR is to prepare for the short-term liquidity needs, and the
NSFR is to have their balance sheets stabilize. In other words, the liquidity regulation
performs a role of boosting the funding stability in both the short and long terms.
However, the NSFR has not been implemented in most countries and we would like to
conduct a simplistic model that can be easy to gure out. Thus, we deal with only the
LCR in this thesis.
4
Figure 1.1: Liquidity Risk
On the other hand, not only the liquidity, a new indicator, namely the leverage ratio,
was also implemented as one of the nancial regulations in an eort of restricting the
volume of non-risk-based assets. Under the regulation, it is dicult to increase the
funds surplus, even if a bank tries to remedy their LCR. In fact, banks have dilemma
between the regulations. Furthermore, existing framework for controlling the risk-
based asset was also strengthened. As a result of such regulatory reforms, banks
are struggling how to develop reasonable strategies for designing their balance-sheet
structures. Therefore, we build an approach that can nd optimal targets for each
regulatory indicator and help to design a rational balance-sheet structure.
1.1.2 Risk Appetite Framework
The crisis experience has also expanded the recognition that is essential to enhance
the discipline of each bank. In November 2013, the Financial Stability Board (FSB)
revealed a principle that will help to facilitate a common understanding between su-
pervisors and nancial rms and to narrow any gaps between supervisory expectations
and practices of banks. Following the principle, banks have established their own risk
appetite frameworks, and coordinated some indicators that are able to control their
earning, liquidity risk and credit risk and so on in accordance with their risk tolerance.
Most banks employ the regulatory indicators as their risk appetite indicators.
For Japanese major banks, funding sustainability for the foreign currency comes
to a critical issue. They have increased their assets in foreign currency in an eort
of securing their benets, while a domestic market encounters the lowest interest rate.
However, they hardly develop the retail business, so they raise funds by the legal entities
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and interbank markets, namely the wholesale funding. These main funding sources are
wholesale funding 1, which are classied as less-stability in the liquidity regulation. In
fact, their businesses in foreign currency are more vulnerable than those in domestic
currency. For that reason, they adopt the indicators controlling their liquidity risk in
foreign currency and strive to maintain the stability for their funding.
However, it is dicult to determine numerical targets for the indicators that is
complementary with the risk tolerance of each bank, though the regulatory levels have
been already given. Banks need methods how to determine the rational targets con-
vincingly. Therefore, we conduct a method that can obtain the targets complying with
the regulatory requirements and satisfying the protability reasonably.
1.2 Literature
There are some papers studying the LCR.Keister and Bech[1] incorporate a liquidity
requirement by the LCR into an economic model for analyzing the process of imple-
menting monetary policy. They study the interaction that may arise between liquidity
regulation and monetary policy implementation. Balasubramanyan and VanHoose[2]
formulate a prot of a bank and verify how the LCR impacts the balance sheet of the
bank and market interest rate. Cetina and Gleason[3] compare the dierence between
Basel and U.S. rule on the LCR and show its metrics for understanding clearly. Like
these, most of them deal with the LCR impacts from the view point of the nancial au-
thorities. There are few studies which refer directly to the cash management strategies
of banks.
1.3 Structure of this thesis
The road map for the rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 illustrates ideas of the
recent regulatory reforms for both liquidity and capital requirement. Additionally, we
conrm the meanings of each indicators. Chapter 3 assembles models that can elicit the
optimal buer over the regulatory requirement in the LCR that is worth with the risk
tolerance of a bank by treating the LCR as a stochastic process. We develop the models
to be more realistic by integrating variations of the amount of the deposit, asset, and
both. Finally, we introduce the workable method of obtaining rational targets in the
liquidity and the capital requirement for risk appetite indicators of a bank regarding the
liquidity and capital by incorporating a function representing regulatory costs. Chapter
4 shows the numerical examples so as to clarify the relationship between the models.
Furthermore, we execute the comparative statics with the intention to develop an
1\Wholesale funding" means liabilities and general obligations that are raised from non-natural
persons (i.e., legal entities).
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optimal cash management strategies, and achieves optimal targets numerically in both
the liquidity and capital requirements. Chapter 5 concludes our study and discusses
future works that are able to be more favorable and easy-to-use.
1.4 Contribution
We facilitate a new favorable scheme that banks can accomplish decision-making ra-
tionally by using simple models with consideration of tangled regulatory requirement.
The risk appetite framework became a pillar of management in the banking sector.
Therefore, most banks agonize over how to determine targets as their business plans
in line with their risk tolerance. Our study helps to resolve their aair.
Besides, we acquire a useful suggestion that cash managements in banks ought to
become more eective by exercising comparative statics. We expect our study would
come to nd solutions for a lot of issues in banks.
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Chapter 2
Financial Regulations
In this chapter, we illustrate the regulatory reforms in the banking sector.
2.1 Liquidity Regulation
Before the crisis, the framework of liquidity risk management had been insucient for
both banks and regulators. Hence, most banks especially in Europe and U.S. went
into the lack of liquidity during the crisis. With this experience, Basel committee on
banking supervision (BCBS) issued \Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management
and Supervision" in September 2008 and required the enhancement of liquidity risk
management both banks and supervisors. Besides, members of G20 committed them-
selves to take action to build a stronger, more globally consistent, supervisory and
regulatory framework for the future nancial sector at the London Summit in April
2009. In accordance with these commitments, BCBS issued a consultative document
\International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring"
in December 2009 and the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding
ratio (NSFR) were suggested. One year later, it published Basel III package \A global
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems". After that, the
working group on BCBS discussed the revision points on the LCR through executing
quantitative impact studies (QIS) for 2 years and approved these revisions in December
2012. After the group of governors and head of supervision (GHOS) endorsed these,
BCBS published the nalized rule \The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk
monitoring tool" in January 2013. For the NSFR, the working group had analyzed
whether the indicator has ability of nding problem banks. However, even at sucient
level banks, it turned out that there was a little collapse after the crisis. Although there
were some bumps and detours, BCBS issued a consultative document revised that was
recalibrated to focus on the riskier types of funding prole employed by banks while
improving alignment with the LCR and so on in January 2014. After that, the detail
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of the NSFR was nalized in October, and published \Basel III: the net stable funding
ratio".
2.1.1 Liquidity Coverage Ratio
The concept of the LCR is to ensure that a bank has an adequate high-quality liquid
asset (HQLA) buer to meet its fund shortage under a liquidity stress situation during
30 calendar days. Namely,
stock of HQLA
Total net cash outows over the next 30 calendar days
 100%: (2.1)
Many countries already implemented the LCR in 2015. The minimum requirement was
set at 60% and rise in equal annual steps to reach 100% in 2019 to prevent material
disruption to the orderly strengthening of banking systems or the ongoing nancing of
economic activity.
Assets can be considered to be HQLA if they can be easily and immediately con-
verted into cash at little or no loss of value. HQLA is divided into 3 categories: level
1 assets, level 2A assets, and level 2B assets. Level 1 assets are limited to coins, ban-
knotes, central bank reserves, marketable securities assigned a 0% risk-weight, and
securities in the bank's home country where sovereign has a non-0% risk weight. Level
2 assets can be included in the stock of HQLA, subject to the requirement that they
comprise no more than 40% of the overall stock after haircuts have been applied. Also,
the haircut is applied to the current market value of each asset. Level 2A assets are
limited to securities assigned a 20% risk-weight and corporate bonds have a credit rat-
ing at least AA-. Level 2B assets are limited to equities that have a credit rating at
A+BBB- and residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS). These can be included
in the stock of HQLA, subject to the requirement that they comprise no more than
15% of the overall stock after haircuts have been applied.
Total net cash outows are dened as the dierence between the total expected
cash outows and total expected cash inows in the specied stress scenario for the
subsequent 30 calendar days. Total expected cash outows are calculated by multiply-
ing the maturing amount among 30 calendar days by the run-o rate according as the
types of liability. For example, retail deposits that are fully insured by an eective de-
posit insurance scheme can be regarded as \stable", then these run-o rate is 3%. Not
insured retail deposits are regarded as \less stable", so these run-o rate is 10%. Also,
the expected cash outows include the draw-down from o -balance commitments.1
Total expected inows are calculated by multiplying the maturing amount among
30 calendar days by the rate based on the expected collection by the categories of
contractual receivables up to an aggregate cap of 75% of total expected cash outows.
1Commitment line means explicit contractual agreements or obligations to extend funds at a future
date to retail or wholesale counter parties.
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The LCR have to be reported to supervisors at least monthly. In stress situations,
the frequency of reporting increases to weekly or even daily at the discretion of the
supervisor. Also, banks should also notify supervisors immediately if their LCR would
fall. Hence, banks are expected to maintain the sucient capacities for calculation.
In Japan, banks disclose their LCR on a quarterly basis that is the daily average for 3
months and the LCR is suggested to be used on an ongoing basis to help monitoring
and controlling risk. Therefore, most banks calculate their LCR on a daily basis.
2.1.2 Net Stable Funding Ratio
The concept of the NSFR is to ensure that banks maintain a stable funding prole in
relation to their on- and o-balance sheet activities. Thus, the regulators expect that
the NSFR reduces the likelihood that a funding disruption of a bank lead to broader
systemic stress. The NSFR is dened as
Available amount of stable funding
Required amount of stable funding
 100%: (2.2)
\Available amount of stable funding" is characterized as the portion of capital and
liabilities expected to be reliable over the time horizon which extends to one year.
\Required amount of stable funding" is calculated based on the liquidity characteristics
and residual maturities of the various assets held by that institution as well as those
of its o-balance sheet exposures. Initially, the NSFR had been supposed to become
a standard by 2018. However, the timing of implementation has not decided yet in
most countries. BCBS recognized that each country can decide by their discretion how
to calculate about derivatives in October 2017, and published a paper that prompts
each country to transit the new standard in December 2017. In that reason, the
implementation of the NSFR would facilitate.
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2.2 Capital Requirement
In Basel III, there are 2 types of indicators requiring the capital. One is the capital
ratio, and the other is the leverage ratio. The capital ratio is a traditional indicator,
and it intends to prevent banks from investing risky assets excessively. On the other
hand, the leverage ratio aims to restrict investment for both risky and non-risky assets.
2.2.1 Capital Ratio
Capital requirement for banks was rstly implemented in 1988 as Basel I to enforce
soundness for international banking system and mitigate compliant of interbank com-
petition. The calculation method of the risk-weighted assets was rened in Basel II
that was nalized in 2004. After the nancial crisis, some reforms had been developed
as Basel III. The minimum requirement level of the common equity raises to 4.5% of
risk-weighted assets from 2.0% and the capital conservation buer (2.5%) is introduced.
Banks are imposed to constraint on discretionary distributions of a bank when banks
fall into the buer range. Furthermore, banks are imposed countercyclical buer rang-
ing within a range of 0-2.5% when authorities judge that credit growth is resulting in
an unacceptable buildup of systematic risk. For global systemically important banks
(G-SIBs), they are obliged additional loss absorbency requirements ranging from 1%
to 2.5%, depending on a systemic importance of a bank.
On the other hand, the calculation method of risk-weighted assets was also rened
in Basel III. It strengthened the capital treatment for certain complex securitizations,
trading activities, and counter party credit risk and so on. The capital ratio is dened
as
Capital Ratio =
Regulatory Capital
risk-weighted asset
: (2.3)
2.2.2 Leverage Ratio
A non-risk based leverage ratio that includes o-balance sheet exposures serves as
a backstop to the risk-based capital requirement, namely the capital ratio. BCBS
published a document regarding the leverage ratio in 2010 at the same time as the
liquidity regulation. The monitoring process in the parallel run period from January
2013 to January 2017 was started. Also, banks began to disclose their leverage ratio
since 2015. GHOS agreed the minimum required level (3%) in January 2016, and
BCBS published a consultative document that to be revised the design in this year. In
December 2017, additional surcharge for G-SIBs were determined. Under the existing
denition for the exposure, this regulation will become pillar I in 2018. The revised
denition will be eective in 2022 and the surcharge for G-SIBs will be implemented
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in 2022. The leverage ratio is dened as
Leverage Ratio =
Tier1 Capital
On- and O- balance sheet exposures
: (2.4)
The denominator is \non-risk" based, so it does not multiply by the risk weight. That
is, it contains even the central bank reserves and the government bond that risk weight
is 0%.
2.3 G-SIBs surcharge
G20 Leaders called on the FSB to propose measures to address the systemic and moral
hazard risks associated with systemically important nancial institutions (SIFIs) at the
Pittsburgh Summit in 2009. SIFIs are institutions of such size, market importance and
interconnectedness that their distress or failure would cause signicant dislocation in
the nancial system and adverse economic consequences. The \too-big-to-fail" (TBTF)
problem arises when the threatened failure of a SIFI leaves public authorities with no
option but to bail it out using public funds to avoid nancial instability and economic
damage. To address the TBTF issues, the framework for additional loss absorbency,
for increased supervisory intensity, for more eective resolution mechanisms, and for
stronger nancial market infrastructure had been discussed.
The global systemic importance of banks (G-SIBs) and insures (G-SIIs) are included
in the G-SIFIs. FSB publishes the list of G-SIBs and G-SIIs every year by assessing
the systemically importance. In November 2017, it selects 30 banks as G-SIBs. For
the G-SIBs, a new strengthened capital regime requiring additional going-concern loss
absorption capacity was suggested. As noted before, the G-SIBs are imposed to increase
their common equity capital against both their risk-weighted assets and their non-risk
based assets according to the systemically importance.
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Chapter 3
Models
This chapter builds models that can elicit the optimal buer over the regulatory re-
quirement in the LCR.
3.1 Setting and Objective
Figure 3.1 illustrates the typical balance sheet of a commercial bank.
The bank owns the high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) because of allowing enough funds
for daily cash management and adhering to the liquidity regulation. Also, it invests
risky assets such as loans in order to meet the demand of its customer and secure its
prots. On the other hand, it raises funds by deposits and corporate bonds to maintain
the ability of funding for assets increasing and meeting obligations as they come due.
In general, the maturities of deposits are shorter than ones of corporate bonds. Hence,
a funding cost of the corporate bond is more expensive than one of the deposit. The
capital fullls a role of stabilizing the cash management because it is perpetual, in
addition to regulatory requirement. Each item of the balance sheet is denoted by the
character in the parenthesis.1
As noted in Equation (2.1), the LCR is a division of the HQLA amount and total
net cash outows. The maturities and total amounts of each items aect the cash
ows, so we incorporate the total expected cash ows in the next 30 days and the
total amounts of each item into our models. X(:) stands for the total amount, and x(:)
stands for the total expected cash ows in the next 30 days stress period. For example,
total amount of a deposit is denoted by XD and the total expected cash outows form
the deposit is denoted by xD. Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationship between the total
amount and the total expected cash outows. Each bar indicates the amount maturing
on each day. The summation of 30 bars with the outow ratio is xD. The summation
of all bars is XD.
1HQLA is denoted by \S" from \surplus".
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Figure 3.1: Balance Sheet
Figure 3.2: Relationship between the total amount, XD, and the expected cash out-
ows, xD, of deposits
Using these setting, the LCR can be written as
LCR(t) =
XS(t)
N(t)
; (3.1)
N(t) := xout(t) min [xin(t); xout(t) 75%]
= max [xout(t)  xin(t); xout(t) 25%] ; (3.2)
xout := xD + xB + ;
xin := xA;
where  stands for the expected cash outows from drawing down by commitment lines
and additional collateral needs and so on.
Then, we consider a cash management plan during period T . In general, T is
determined on the frequency of corporate bond issuances, because the original term
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of ordinary corporate bonds is longer than 30 calendar days. Hence, the bank can
increase the HQLA without aecting its LCR.
For seeking an eective cash management plan, we need to revolve both the regulations
and the protability. Banks are supervised by the authorities, so they have to avoid
infringing the regulatory requirement. Thus, we consider a plan that restrain the breach
probability to (1  ). An acceptable breach probability should be determined to meet
a risk tolerance of each bank.
Also, as mentioned before, they have to adhere to not only the LCR, but also the
leverage ratio that is not easy to increase the HQLA. Banks also do not want to hold
the excess HQLA in order to pursue their protability, because the return of the HQLA
is lower than one of the risky assets and sometimes lower than their borrowing rate.
Therefore, banks want to nd a buer of the HQLA satisfying
P () := P

min
0tT
LCR(t) < 

= 1  ; (3.3)
where
LCR(0) =
XS(0)
N(0)
= + :
Here,  stands for the regulatory requirement level in the LCR, and  stands for the
bank's voluntary buer over the regulation. If a bank treats the LCR as its risk appetite
indicator, (+ ) can be a target that meets its risk tolerance.
Equation (3.3) represents the breach probability of the LCR by using the rst-passage-
time model. Figure 3.3 shows a sample path of the LCR. It supposes that a bank
prepares the total amount of HQLA appropriate for  = 20% at t = 0, and its authority
sets a regulatory requirement as 100%. An infringing occurs when the minimum level
of the LCR during T is less than the regulatory requirement. Thus, we can obtain the
breach probability by running a lot of paths of the LCR.
Also, we know the starting point N(0) at t = 0, hence denote it by \y", thus the staring
position of HQLA is written by
XS(0) = (+ )y: (3.4)
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Figure 3.3: Sample Path of the LCR
3.2 Analytic Model
We consider a model that can obtain an analytical solution, i.e., an optimal liquidity
buer over the regulatory requirement.
3.2.1 Additional Setting
Additional settings are needed to obtain an analytical solution. At rst, we consider
a setting for cash ows. We treat the total net cash outows, N(t), as a stochastic
process represented by
dN(t)
N(t)
= Ndt+ Ndz(t); N(0) =: y; (3.5)
where N and N are constant. Actually, N(t) is the larger of the dierence between
the total expected cash outows and inows and 25% of cash outows, as noted by
Equation (3.2). Thus, it is not realistic in general, though it works eectively when
the levels of the total expected cash outows and inows are quite dierent, and when
we suppose that a bank can not fully control its maturing amount.
In Japan, banks are imposed to disclose their daily-average of the LCR on a quar-
terly basis. (see gure A.1 in Appendix A). Therefore, they have enough data that can
calibrate the parameters of Equation (3.5).
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Then, we consider a setting for the total amounts. At t = 0, a bank prepares the
initial volume of the HQLA, XS(0), satisfying Equation (3.4) funded by the corpo-
rate bond.2 The amount of the HQLA, asset, deposit, corporate bond, and capital,
(XS; XA; XD; XB; XC), are constant during T .
By using these additional settings, Equation (3.3) can be rewritten by
P () := P

max
0tT
N(t) <
(+ )y


= 1  ; (3.6)
where
XS; XA; XD; XB; XC : constant at t 2 (0; T ):
3.2.2 The Solution
Equation (3.5) can be rewritten by using N(0) = y as
N(t) = y exp
 
N   122N

t+ NzN(t)
	
:
Also, the bracket of Equation (3.6) is
max
0t<T

N   1
2
2N

t+ NzN(t) > log

+ 


: (3.7)
According to Shreve[11], we obtain the distribution of Equation (3.6) as below by using
the reection principal:3
P () = 1 N

m()  Tp
T

+ e2m()N
 m()  Tp
T

= 1  ; (3.9)
where (
 = N   122N ;
m() = log

+


:
2An original term of the corporate bond is longer than 30 days, so it does not aect the bank's
LCR position.
3Brownian motion and distribution of its maximum: Dene,
[W (t) = t+W (t)
[M(t) = max
0tT
[W (t)
where W is Brownian motion and  is constant number. Then,
P

[M(t)  m

= N

m  Tp
T

  e2mN
 m  Tp
T

; m  0: (3.8)
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Therefore, the optimal  satises
N

m()  Tp
T

  e2m()N
 m()  Tp
T

= : (3.10)
We can easily obtain an adequate buer over the regulatory requirement in the LCR
by estimating each parameter from historical data of each bank, and by determining
the period for its cash management plan and the acceptable breach probability.
3.2.3 Extension to the Multi-Period
By Equation (3.9), the breach probability is independent of the starting point of the
total net cash outows, y. Thus, it is easy to extend to the multi-period problem. It
is useful when a bank determines the period for its cash management plan, T . Then,
we consider a business period; T := mT . T depends on the term of a business plan,
so one or three years is common in the Japanese banks. Also, the initial volume of the
HQLA on each T is supposed to be adjusted by the sucient long-term funding such
as corporate bond.
Hence, the breach probability during T is
P(; T ) = 1  (1  P (; T ))m : (3.11)
From Equation (3.11), we nd that if  increases with an xed T , then P decreases.
On the other hand, if T increases with an xed , then P increases. Therefore, we can
obtain an optimal  and T by considering an adequate cost function, though we do
not refer in this thesis.
3.2.4 Summary
We can obtain an analytical solution from this model, and it is easy to extend to the
multi-period problem. However, it is not realistic because the oor of the total net
cash outows is not incorporate. Additionally, this model is dicult to extend to the
multi-currency problem. In general, banks operate their cash management by currency.
Thus, it is reasonable setting that the total net cash outows of each currency follow
the geometric Brownian motion respectively. However, the LCR is measured by the
summation of all currencies.4 Hence, the LCR is the summation of the geometric
Brownian motions. It is dicult to treat it when developing an analytical solution.
Therefore, this is the cons of the analytic model.5
4Some countries impose the currency base LCR in addition to the all currencies base LCR.
5If seeking an analytical solution, the moment-matching method is useful. There are a lot of
methods for pricing the basket options and the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) options.
For example, Brigo et al[12] study the approximation of the basket options and Funahashi and
Kijima[13] study the VWAP options.
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Figure 3.4: Overview of the Simulation Models
3.3 Simulation Model
We need to introduce other models to overcome the negative point of the analytic
model. Figure 3.4 shows an overview of the models to be explained. At the rst
model, we treat the total expected cash outows and inows as stochastic processes
respectively. The second model extends the rst model, and incorporates the variation
of the deposit amount. The third model involves the variation of the asset amount,
instead of the deposit amount variation. The Last model integrates both the variations
of the deposit and the asset amount. The amount of HQLA varies according to the
movement of other lending or borrowing amount.
3.3.1 Base Model
At rst, we consider the most simplistic model. In this model, we treat the total
expected cash outows and inows as stochastic processes respectively in order to
represent a oor rule.
Banks try to make its cash management stabilize by smoothing their maturing
amounts. However, they can not control their whole positions, because they get a deal
with other banks or customers. Only major banks are easy to control because they
have more authority for the negotiation of the condition. Hence, it is a reasonable
setting that their total expected cash outows and inows follow the mean-reversion
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processes.6 However, it is dicult for most banks, especially foreign banks to control
their maturing amount constantly. Therefore, we treat as the diusion processes.
Other settings are the same as the analytic model. Prepare the initial volume of
HQLA (XS(0)) satisfying Equation (3.3) and the amount of HQLA, asset, deposit,
corporate bond, and capital, (XS; XA; XD; XB; XC), are constant during T .
dxout(t)=xout(t)
dxin(t)=xin(t)

=

out
in

dt+ 


dzout(t)
dzin(t)

; (3.12)
where

  
0 =

2out out;inoutin
out;inoutin 
2
in

; (3.13)
xout(0) = xout; xin(0) = xin:
In this model, total net cash outows are the subtraction of the geometric Brownian
motions. Appendix C introduces the approximation method about it.
3.3.2 Deposit Variation Model
We incorporate a deposit variation to make more realistic. Figure 3.5 is the transition
of the deposit amount in Japanese major banks. The deposit amount varies stochas-
tically. Hence, we treat the deposit amount, XD, as a stochastic process in addition
to the total expected cash outows and inows. An increment of the deposit amount
means a boost of the bank's capability for investment. Hence, it can increase either
risky assets or non-risky assets. This model supposes that the bank would invest to
non-risky assets, namely HQLA in order to avoid the infringing of the regulatory re-
quirement. Conversely, when the deposit amount decreases, the bank would reimburse
it to depositor by using HQLA, because most assets have not yet matured. Equation
(3.14) represents this setting. Also, prepare the initial volume of HQLA, XS(0), satisfy-
ing Equation (3.3), and the amount of asset, corporate bond and capital, (XA; XB; XC),
are constant during T .
dXS(t) = dXD(t); (3.14)24dXD(t)=XD(t)dxout(t)=xout(t)
dxin(t)=xin(t)
35 =
24 Dout
in
35 dt+ 

24 dzD(t)dzout(t)
dzin(t)
35 ; (3.15)
6We roughly refer this setting in Appendix B.
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Figure 3.5: Monthly Deposit Variation in Japanese major banks
where

  
0 =
24 2D D;outDout D;inDinD;outDout 2outout;inoutin
D;inDin out;inoutin 
2
in
35 ; (3.16)
XD(0) = XD; xout(0) = xout; xin(0) = xin:
When calibrating these parameters, we have to care about the positive deniteness
for covariance matrix in Equation (3.16). Also, Figure A.2 in Appendix A is the rela-
tionship between the deposit amount and its total expected cash outows in Japanese
major banks. It is not enough data, but the fraction of the deposit amount and its
cash outows is roughly constant. Therefore, the correlation of these, D;out, can be
presumed to be positive.
3.3.3 Asset Variation Model
At third, we consider the asset variation instead of the deposit variation. Figure 3.6
is the transition of the asset amount in Japanese major banks. The asset amount
varies stochastically as the same as the deposit amount. Hence, we treat the asset
amount, XA, as a stochastic process in addition to the total expected cash outows and
inows. An increment of the asset amount makes the bank's capability for investment
depressed. Thus, the bank has to decrease non-risky assets or increase the deposit.
21
Figure 3.6: Monthly Asset Variation in Japanese major banks
This model supposes that a bank would shift funds from non-risky assets, namely
HQLA, because there is not always possibility to fund by the deposit over the 30
calendar days. Conversely, when the asset amount decreases, HQLA amount increases.
Equation (3.17) represents this setting. Also, prepare the initial volume of HQLA,
XS(0), satisfying Equation (3.3), the amount of deposit, corporate bond and capital,
(XD; XB; XC), are constant during T .
dXS(t) =  dXA(t); (3.17)24 dXA(t)=XA(t)dxout(t)=xout(t)
dxin(t)=xin(t)
35 =
24 Aout
in
35 dt+ 

24 dzA(t)dzout(t)
dzin(t)
35 ; (3.18)
where

  
0 =
24 2A A;outAout A;inAinA;outAout 2out out;inoutin
A;inAin out;inoutin 
2
in
35 ; (3.19)
XA(0) = XA; xout(0) = xout; xin(0) = xin:
When calibrating these parameters, we have to care about the positive deniteness
for covariance matrix in Equation (3.19). Also, Figure A.3 in Appendix A is the
relationship between the asset amount and its total expected cash inows in Japanese
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major banks. There is not enough data, but the fraction of the asset amount and
its cash inows is roughly constant. Therefore, the correlation of these, A;in, can be
presumed to be positive.
3.3.4 Full Model
Finally, we consider a full model to make it more realistic. It treats both the asset and
the deposit amounts, (XA; XD), as stochastic processes. Also, we consider the upper
limit of the asset amount by revolving the regulation for capital requirement against
the risk-weighted-assets amount, that is the capital ratio.
We dene a voluntary capital ratio,  ; it can be a target of the risk appetite
indicator, and a factor converted non-risk-based assets amount into risk-weighted-asset
amount, !.7 That is to say, the upper limit of the asset amount, XmaxA , satises
 =
XC
XmaxA  !
, XmaxA =
XC
 !
: (3.20)
The asset amount normally follows the geometric Brownian motion. However, when
it reaches the barrier level, in the next step, it can either remain or move downward.
Hence, the asset amount has a retaining barrier.
Similar to the previous models, HQLA varies according to the movement of the asset
and deposit amounts. However, when increasing the deposit amount, a bank uses this
fund to invest risky assets according to correlation between the deposit and the asset
amount to the extent that does not exceed the voluntary capital ratio. If it can not
invest risky assets, HQLA amount increases. Conversely, when decreasing the deposit
amount, a bank collects their assets according to correlation between the deposit and
the asset amounts, or uses their HQLA for reimbursing the deposit. Figure 3.7 shows
the change rate of the asset and the deposit amounts. In general, the correlation
between the asset and the deposit amounts is positive. Equation (3.21) represents
these settings. Also, prepare the initial volume of HQLA, XS(0), satisfying Equation
(3.3), the amount of corporate bond and capital, (XB; XC), are constant during T .
dXS(t) = dXD(t)  dXA(t); (3.21)2664
dXD(t)=XD(t)
dXA(t)=XA(t)
dxout(t)=xout(t)
dxin(t)=xin(t)
3775 =
2664
D
A
out
in
3775 dt+ 

2664
dzD(t)
dzA(t)
dzout(t)
dzin(t)
3775 ; (3.22)
7As Figure A.4 in Appendix A shows, the factor is almost constant
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Figure 3.7: Monthly Deposit and Asset Variation in Japanese major banks
where

  
0 =
2664
2D D;ADA D;outDout D;inDin
D;ADA 
2
A A;outAout A;inAin
D;outDout A;outAout 
2
out out;inoutin
D;inDin A;inAin out;inoutin 
2
in
3775 ; (3.23)
XD(0) = XD; XA(0) = XA; xout(0) = xout; xin(0) = xin:
When calibrating these parameters, we have to care about the positive deniteness for
covariance matrix in Equation (3.23). As noted before, the correlation between the
deposit and the asset amount, and the correlation between the deposit amount and the
total expected cash outows, and the correlation between the asset amount and the
total expected cash inows can be presumed to be positive.
3.3.5 Optimal Voluntary Buer Levels
For obtaining a more eective cash management strategy, we consider optimal volun-
tary levels of both liquidity and capital regulations. In the full model, if the voluntary
capital buer ( ) is high, it is dicult for the bank to invest more risky assets, so it
increases HQLA. Hence, opportunity loss would occur, while the voluntary liquidity
buer, , would decrease because the breach probability for the regulatory requirement
for the LCR would become low by the sucient HQLA. On the other hand, if  is low,
it is easy for the bank to invest more risky assets. However, the breach probability for
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the LCR would become high. The bank prepares more excess HQLA, thus the funding
cost for HQLA would become expensive. Therefore, we can nd the optimal level by
considering an appropriate cost functions for opportunity loss and funding cost.
We dene opportunity loss as
TX
t=0
s

E
h
~XA(t) XA(t)
i
=: fOL; (3.24)
where ~X is the asset amount without a retaining barrier, and s is a loan spread.
On the other hand, when the voluntary buer for the LCR is high, the bank has to
acquire a lot of HQLA, so its funding cost increases.
Also, we dene funding cost as
c  fXS(0) XS(0)g =: fFC ; (3.25)
where c is a borrowing spread, and XS(0) is the regulatory required amount.
Regulatory cost is dened as the summation of opportunity loss and funding cost,
i.e.,
fRC = fOL + fFC : (3.26)
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Chapter 4
Numerical Example
The optimal cash management strategy depends on the characteristics of a bank's
existing balance-sheet structure. We conrm the relationship between the simulation
models, and examine the eects of some parameters. The parameters are set according
to Japanese major banks with noise as shown in Table 4.1. In actual situation, as
noted in Chapter 2, most banks calculate the LCR daily basis, though not disclose
daily gure, for responding the supervisor's requirements and controlling own liquidity
risk. Hence, it is easy to calibrate the parameters.
4.1 Relationship between the Simulation Models
Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between simulation models dened in Chapter 3. This
shows the optimal liquidity buer, , satisfying Equation (3.6) to meet each breach
probability for the LCR, (1  ). The base model (orange line) positions between the
deposit variation model (green line) and the asset variation model (yellow line). That
is because the deposit variation is positive eect for the amount of HQLA, while the
asset variation is negative eect. The amounts of the deposit and the asset tend to
increase by positive drift, D; A. Hence, the deposit variation model requires less
liquidity buer, while the asset variation model requires more it. The full model (blue
line) positions between the base model (orange line) and the deposit variation model
(green line). It is according to the level of the retaining barrier, however the correlation
between the deposit amount and the total expected cash outows, D;out, is higher than
the correlation between the asset amount and the total expected cash inows, A;in,
and additionally the amounts of the deposit and the asset diuse as the same, D = A,
D = A. Therefore, the amount of HQLA in the full model is easier to increase than
one in the asset variation model.
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Deposit XD JPY 190 trillion
D 0.0001
D 0.001
Asset XA JPY 170 trillion
A 0.0001
A 0.001
! 0.5
outows xout JPY 49 trillion
out 0.003
out 0.015
inows xin JPY 10 trillion
in 0.001
in 0.06
Capital XC JPY 13 trillion
Cor D;A 0.8
D;out 0.8
A;in 0.5
out;in 0.5
D;in 0.3
A;out 0.5
Threshold  15.2%
 100%
Term T 60 business days
Table 4.1: Parameters
4.2 Comparative Statics
The optimal liquidity buer depends on the characteristics of the structures of the
balance-sheet and cash ows. We examine the eect of some parameters in order to
consider the optimal cash management strategy, when the breach probability is 10%.
4.2.1 Impact of Volatilities in the Base Model
We observe the impact of the volatilities of the expected cash outows and inows,
(out; in), in the base model.
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Figure 4.1: LCR Breach Probability vs Optimal Liquidity Buer
Volatility of the Total Expected Cash Outows
Figure 4.2 shows the relationship between the volatility of the total expected cash
outows, out, and the its optimal liquidity buer, , by the correlation between the
total expected cash outows and inows, out;in. It shows that there is a minimum
level for the optimal liquidity buer when out;in is positive. This is because the total
net cash outows, the denominator of the LCR, are modeled by subtraction of the 2
Brownian motions. Thus, the bank is able to minimize the liquidity buer by operating
with a few volatilities for the total expected cash outows. In other words, banks can
reduce the liquidity buer by controlling their maturing amount of the deposit per day
exibly, instead of trying to smooth their maturing amount.
Volatility of the Total Expected Cash Inows
Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between the volatility of the total expected cash
inows, in, and the its optimal liquidity buer, , by the correlation between the
total expected cash outows and inows, out;in. There is a minimum level for the
optimal liquidity buer when out;in is positive, as the same as the volatility of the total
expected cash outows. Therefore, banks can reduce the liquidity buer by controlling
their maturing amount of the asset per day exibly, instead of trying to smooth their
maturing amount, not only one of the deposit.
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Figure 4.2: Optimal Liquidity Buer vs Volatility of Cash Outows
Figure 4.3: Optimal Liquidity Buer vs Volatility of Cash Inows
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Figure 4.4: Optimal Liquidity Buer vs Correlation
4.2.2 Impact of Correlation in the Base Model
Figure 4.4 shows the optimal liquidity buer,  by the correlation between the total
expected cash outows and inows, out;in. We can imagine easily that out;in aects the
level of the optimal liquidity buer. As we can surmise, the higher the correlation is, the
lower the optimal liquidity buer is. However, the reduction of the buer accelerates
at a high correlation level. Hence, the optimal liquidity buer increases signicantly,
even if the correlation decreases slightly. Therefore, we can nd that banks need to
monitor the correlation levels carefully.
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Figure 4.5: Optimal Liquidity buer vs Volatility of the Deposit Amount
4.2.3 Impact of Volatility in the Deposit Variation Model
The volatility of the deposit amount, D, is important for the cash management in the
banks, because they can not fully control their deposits. Hence, we observe the eect
of the volatility of the deposit amount in the deposit variation model.
Figure 4.5 shows the optimal liquidity buer by the volatility of the deposit amount.
It shows there is a minimum level, so banks can suppress their excess funds at the
minimum point, that is with a few volatilities. This is because the LCR is modeled by
subtraction of the Brownian motions in the deposit model. Therefore, banks should
try to control their deposit amount well-exibly in order to accomplish the eective
cash management.
31
Figure 4.6: Optimal Liquidity Buer vs Volatility of the Asset Amount
4.2.4 Impact of Volatility in the Asset Variation Model
We observe the eect of the volatility of the asset amount, A, in order to contrast it
with the volatility of the deposit amount.
Figure 4.6 shows the optimal liquidity buer by the volatility of the asset amounts.
Apart from the volatility of the deposit amount, it is monotonically increasing. This
dierence is caused by the fact that the LCR is modeled by subtraction of the Brownian
motions in the deposit variation model, while the LCR is modeled by the summation
of the Brownian motions. Obviously, banks should suppress their volatility of the asset
amount in order to avoid holding HQLA excessively.
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Figure 4.7: Required Buer vs Voluntary Capital Ratio
4.2.5 Impact of Capital Ratio in the Full Model
Banks mostly concern about the relationship between the thresholds of both the capital
ratio for the risk-weighted assets ( ) and the LCR, in order to determine their eective
business plan.
Figure 4.7 shows the optimal liquidity buer for adhering to the LCR by the capital
ratio. The higher the capital ratio is, the lower the liquidity buer is. This is because
a bank increases its HQLA in order not to be able to invest risky assets, when capital
trigger is high. On the other hand, it decreases its HQLA in order to invest more risky
assets when the capital trigger is low. Therefore, we can nd the optimal levels for
both liquidity and capital regulations by considering an appropriate cost function (see
the next section).
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Loan Spread s 50 bps
Borrowing Spread c 2 bps
Table 4.2: Parameters
Figure 4.8: Regulatory Cost vs Capital Ratio
4.3 Optimal Levels
We construct the rough cost function in the previous chapter. In this section, we
introduce the method of obtaining the optimal capital and liquidity target by setting
additional parameters form Japanese major banks with noise, as in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.8 shows the regulatory cost by the capital ratio,  . The lowest level of the
total cost (green line) is the optimal, hence the optimal capital target is 8%, though it
is not concave. Also, the optimal liquidity buer is 22%, when the capital target is 8%.
Japanese banks should increase their risky asset so as to secure their prots according
to this model. This result is consistent with the fact that the cost of maintaining the
HQLA is quite low, because of low policy rate in Japanese market.
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4.4 Summary
Banks usually try to keep their deposit amount so as to smooth their maturing amount
per day for the stable cash management. The comparative statics show that they should
operate with well-exibly, that is with a few volatilities for the deposit amount and the
total expected cash outows and inows, in order to achieve to reduce their regulatory
cost. Also, banks need to monitor the correlation between the total expected cash
outows and inows, especially when it is at high level, because of preventing from
surging the breach probability for the LCR.
Besides, banks can nd the optimal target for both the liquidity and capital reg-
ulations which is useful for determining the target of the risk appetite indicator, by
incorporating an adequate function representing the regulatory cost.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
After the nancial crisis, a lot of regulatory reforms had been implemented. Banks
are struggling how to develop reasonable designs for their balance sheets under the
regulations. Also, they have endeavored to control their protability, risk, and so on
by using the risk appetite indicators, though it is dicult to determine the targets.
Our study can obtain the optimal target for not only the LCR, but also the capital
ratio. It is very useful for determining the rational business plan, that is the target of
the risk appetite indicators. Besides, we can nd that banks should operate their cash
management, as far as the controls of the deposit amount and the maturing amount
of the asset and deposit, with well-exibly, not fully stable. These operations enable
banks to reduce their regulatory cost for the LCR.
Our study is an initial stage for addressing the above problems, so we use only the
most simplistic model. Therefore, we discuss about future works that can obtain more
realistic and convenient method so as to make use of it in actual operation. At rst, we
would like to extend the model to multi-currency. In actual situation, banks control
their funds by currency. Hence, we would represent each currency as a stochastic
process by using the approximation methods such as the pricing methods in the basket
options. Also, the approximation methods are useful for our model because of obtaining
targets in a timely manner. Besides, we take in more adequate cost functions reecting
the realistic situation are needed.
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Appendix A
Performance of Japanese Banks
A.1 Total net cash outows on the LCR
Figure A.1: Quarterly average in Japanese major banks.
37
A.2 Deposit amount and Total Expected Cash Out-
ows
Figure A.2: Quarterly average in Japanese major banks.
A.3 Asset amount and Total Expected Cash In-
ows
Figure A.3: Quarterly average in Japanese major banks.
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A.4 Conversion Factor for Risk-weighted Asset
Figure A.4: Quarterly disclosure in Japanese major banks.
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Appendix B
Mean-Reversion Model
For the largest banks, the assumption that treat cash outows and inows as diusion
processes is too conservative, because they can handle their maturing amounts of assets
and deposits easier. They try to smooth their maturing amounts due to make their
funding stable. Thus, it is natural assumption that cash ows in the 30 days stress
period calculated by their maturing amount follow the mean-reversion process.
B.1 Setting
Total expected cash outows, ~xout, follow
d~xout(t) = aout(~out   ~xout(t))dt+ ~outd~zout(t); ~xout(0) = ~xout: (B.1)
Also, cash inows, ~xin, follow
d~xin(t) = ain(~in   ~xin(t))dt+ ~ind~zin(t); ~xin(0) = ~xin; (B.2)
where
d~zout(t)d~zin(t) = ~dt;   0: (B.3)
Our objective is to nd the adequate liquidity buer, , satisfying Equation (3.3). We
can obtain an optimal buer by running the paths following the above processes and
calculating the total net cash outows.
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B.2 Numerical Example
We conrm the dierence between the base model and mean-reversion model by using
a numerical example.
Parameters
TableB.1 shows the parameters which are set according to Japanese banks with noise.
These parameters also can be calibrated, because most banks have the LCR data on a
daily basis.
outows aout 0.03
~xout JPY 49 trillion
~out 50
~out 1.4
inows ain 0.03
~xin JPY 4.9(10) trillion
~in 5
~in 0.5
Cor out;in 0.5
Trigger  100%
Term T 60 business days
Table B.1: Parameters
Numerical Result
Figure B.1 shows the optimal liquidity buer, , by the correlation between the total
expected cash outows and inows, ~out;in. As the same as the base model (see Figure
4.4), the higher correlation is, the lower the optimal liquidity buer is. However, the
reduction of the buer does not accelerate, apart from the base model. Therefore, the
monitoring for the correlation level is not necessary in the major banks that can control
their maturing amount suciently.
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Figure B.1: Optimal Liquidity Buer vs Correlation
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Appendix C
Moment-Matching Method
Approximation method
We consider the approximation based on the method in Kijima[14]; (xout(t); xout(t)  
xin(t))  (xout(t); x^(t)). We suppose (xout(t); x^(t)) follows the quadratic log-normal
distribution. We nd the parameters of x^(t) by following approach.
We approximate
E[xout(t)  xin(t)] = E[x^(t)]; (C.1)
E[(xout(t)  xin(t))2] = E[x^(t)2]; (C.2)
E[xout(t)  (xout(t)  xin(t))] = E[xout(t)x^(t)]; (C.3)
where
x^(t) = x^ exp

^(t)  1
2
^(t)2

t+ ^(t)z^(t)

; (C.4)
dxout(t)dx^(t) = ^(t)dt: (C.5)
Here,
E[x^(t)] = x^ exp

^(t)t  1
2
^(t)2t

E[exp(^(t)z^(t))]
= x^ exp (^(t)t) ; (C.6)
E[x^(t)2] = x^2 exp
 
2^(t)t  ^(t)2tE[exp(2^(t)z^(t))]
= x^2 exp(2^(t)t+ ^(t)2t); (C.7)
E[xout(t)x^(t)] = x
outx^ exp

out + ^(t)  1
2
2out  
1
2
^(t)2

t

 E [exp(outzout(t) + ^(t)z^(t))]
= xoutx^ exp (outt+ ^(t)t+ ^(t)out^(t)t) : (C.8)
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On the other hand,
E [xout(t)  xin(t)] = xout exp

outt  1
2
2outt

E [exp(outzout(t))]
 xin exp

int  1
2
2int

E [exp(inzin(t))]
= xout exp(outt)  xin exp(int); (C.9)
E

(xout(t)  xin(t))2

= E

xout(t)
2 + xin(t)
2   2xout(t)xin(t)

= E

xout(t)
2

+ E

xin(t)
2
  2E [xout(t)xin(t)] ;(C.10)
where
E

xout(t)
2

= x2out exp

2outt+ 
2
outt
	
;
E

xin(t)
2

= x2in exp

2int+ 
2
int
	
;
E [xout(t)xin(t)] = xoutxin exp

(out + in)t  1
2
2outt 
1
2
2int

E  [expfoutzout(t) + inzin(t)g]
= xoutxin exp f(out + in)t+ out;inoutintg :
Also,
E [xout(t) (xout(t)  xin(t))] = E

xout(t)
2
  E [xout(t)xin(t)] : (C.11)
Therefore, by Equation (C.1), ^t satises
E[x^(t)] = E[xout(t)  xin(t)]
, x^ exp(^(t)t) = xout exp(outt)  xin exp(int)
, ^(t) = 1
t
log
1
x^
fxout(exp(outt)  xin exp(int))g : (C.12)
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By Equation (C.2), ^t satises
E[x^(t)2] = E

(xout(t)  xin(t))2

, x^2 exp(2^(t)t+ ^(t)2t) = E xout(t)2+ E xin(t)2  2E [xout(t)xin(t)]
= x2out exp(2outt+ 
2
outt)
+x2in exp(2int+ 
2
int)
 2xoutxin exp f(out + in)t+ out;inoutintg
, exp(2^(t)t+ ^(t)2t) =
xout
x^
2
exp(2outt+ (out)
2t)
+
xin
x^
2
exp(2int+ (in)
2t)
 2
xoutxin
x^2

exp f(out + in)t+ outintg
=: c1 + c2   2c3
, ^2t =
1
t
log(c1 + c2   2c3)  2^(t)
, ^t =

1
t
log(c1 + c2   2c3)  2^(t)
 1
2
: (C.13)
Additionally, by Equation(C.3), we obtain
E[xout(t)x^(t)] = E [xout(t) (xout(t)  xin(t))]
, xoutx^ exp (outt+ ^(t)t+ ^(t)out^(t)t) = x2out exp
 
2outt+ 
2
outt

 xoutxin exp (outt+ int+ out;inoutint)
, exp (outt+ ^(t)t+ ^(t)out^(t)t) =
xout
x^

exp
 
2outt+ 
2
outt

 
xin
x^

exp (outt+ int+ out;inoutint)
=: d1   d2
, (out + ^(t) + ^(t)out^(t)) t = log(d1   d2)
, ^t = 1
out^(t)


1
t
log(d1   d2)  out   ^(t)

: (C.14)
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outows xout JPY 49 trillion
out 0.0003
out 0.015
inows xin JPY 4.9 trillion
in 0.001
in 0.06
Cor out;in 0.6
Term T 60 business days
Table C.1: Parameters
Accuracy of the Approximation
We compare the simulated distribution of (xoutt  xint ) and the approximated distribution
of x^ because of assessing the approximation. Parameters are set as in Table C.1.
Movement of Parameter
As developed in the previous section, the parameters of the approximated distribution
depend on t as shown in Figure C.1, C.2, and C.3.
Figure C.1: ^t
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Figure C.2: ^t
Figure C.3: ^t
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Distribution
Figure C.4 and C.5 show the original (black line) and approximated (red line) distri-
butions.
Figure C.4: Distribution of (xout   xin) at certain t
Figure C.5: Distribution of max(xoutt   xint )
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Summary
This method is probable approximation substantially according to Figure C.4 and
C.5. However, all parameters of the approximated distribution is time-dependent.
(see Equation C.12, C.13, and C.14.) We have to obtain the joint probability density
of (xout; x^), when eliciting an optimal liquidity buer. Thus, it is dicult to treat
the time-dependent parameters without simulating. In other words, we need another
approach, when obtaining a target in a timely manner.
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